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    A private jet, a celebrity attorney turned convicted embezzler, a federal seizure, and a $15 million punitive damages award: the facts of Passport 420, LLC v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company read like the plot of Hollywood’s latest film rather than a California insurance coverage dispute.

    Passport 420, LLC (“Passport 420”) bought a private jet for use by its owners.  In Passport 420, LLC v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co. (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 967, that private jet was seized by law enforcement officials to satisfy a judgment issued against Michael Avenatti, one of Passport 420’s owners, for embezzlement.  Passport 420 filed an insurance claim against the jet’s insurer, seeking reimbursement for the value of the jet.  The insurer declined coverage, arguing that Passport 420 was obligated to disclose to the insurer Passport 420’s knowledge of the potential risk of seizure, given Mr. Avenatti’s knowledge of his embezzlement during the time he was serving as the manager of Passport 420.  The jury found against the insurer and awarded Passport 420 an award of more than $21 million.

    On October 1, 2026, the California Court of Appeal reversed the jury’s verdict. The court held that an applicant for insurance must disclose material facts within its knowledge, even when the insurer never asks about them. (Ins. Code, § 332.)  Because Michael Avenatti was the manager of Passport 420 when he used embezzled funds to buy the jet and when the company obtained its policy, his knowledge was imputed to the company. The concealment of that fact entitled the insurer to rescind the policy. (§ 331.)  Although the case arose from an unusual set of facts, its reasoning carries implications for any business entity that procures insurance through a manager or other agent, and for the co-owners who may be left holding a void policy. The case also offers a useful vantage point for testing how far imputed knowledge can carry an insurer’s right to rescind, and how the outcome might have changed had a different member been at the controls.

    The following article proceeds in evaluating this decision through three parts.  Part One sets out the holding of Passport 420, LLC v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company.  Part Two explains how the court converted those facts into law.  Part Three considers a variation the opinion leaves open: whether the result would change if Avenatti’s co-member, William Parrish, had been the manager at the time the jet was purchased and insured.

    Part One: What Happened in Passport 420

    In 2016, Avenatti represented William Parrish, a successful engineer, businessman, and licensed pilot.  At Avenatti’s suggestion, the two agreed to buy a jet together.  Avenatti drafted an operating agreement creating Passport 420, whose two members were Avenatti’s law firm, Avenatti & Associates APC, and Spring Creek Research LLC (“Spring Creek”), an entity Parrish controlled.  Spring Creek contributed 52.7 percent of the purchase price; Avenatti & Associates contributed the remainder.  Section 5 of the operating agreement vested “full and complete authority, power and discretion” in a single Manager whose actions “shall bind the Company.”  Avenatti was appointed Manager, and no further election was ever held.

    What Parrish did not know was that Avenatti had embezzled approximately two million dollars from a client and used that money to fund his share of the purchase.  It is undisputed that Parrish had no actual knowledge of, and did not participate in, the crime.

    Passport 420 took delivery of the aircraft in January 2017.  Starr Indemnity & Liability Company (“Starr”) insured the aircraft.  The insurance application asked about the aircraft, its pilots, maintenance arrangements, and any liens or loans, but not explicitly about the source of the purchase funds or the finances of Passport 420 or its members.  Starr conducted no inquiry into those subjects beyond a Google search of Avenatti’s and Parrish’s names.  However, such a limited investigation is not necessarily inconsistent with standard insurance industry practices absent circumstances that would have placed Starr on notice of the need for further inquiry.  Star’s policy, effective January 26, 2017, included a “War Risk” endorsement covering “physical loss” caused by “seizure . . . by, or under the order of any government.”

    By spring 2018, Avenatti and Passport 420’s relationship had fractured.  Avenatti stopped paying Passport’s bills, and Parrish assumed managerial duties.  In August 2018, Avenatti refused to sign a document formally appointing Parrish as manager.  Parrish notified Avenatti that he would “assume the role of Manager.”  Avenatti did not respond.  About six months later, Parrish signed and submitted the renewal application for the insurance policy on Passport’s behalf, replacing Avenatti’s information with his own.  Starr renewed the policy without further inquiry.

    On April 10, 2019, the United States Treasury Department seized the aircraft, and the same day Avenatti was indicted for wire and bank fraud.  Parrish submitted a sworn proof of loss for $3,990,000, the insured value less the deductible.  Starr issued a reservation of rights, Passport 420 sued for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and, after Avenatti’s conviction, Starr denied the claim and purported to rescind the policy on the ground of concealment.

    The trial court denied Starr’s motion for judgment, finding Starr’s underwriting “lackadaisical” and its testimony on materiality self-serving.  The jury returned a verdict for Passport, and the resulting judgment included $3,990,000 under the policy, more than $1 million in prejudgment interest, $1.4 million in attorney’s fees, and $15 million in punitive damages.  The Court of Appeal reversed in full.

    Part Two: How the Facts Became Law

    The court reached only one of Starr’s eight contentions, concluding that the equitable rescission issue was dispositive of the entire appeal.  The court’s analysis proceeded in two steps: first, whether the embezzlement was a material fact Passport 420 was obliged to disclose; and second, whether Avenatti’s knowledge of that fact was imputed to Passport.

    The Insurance Code imposes “heavy burdens of disclosure” on both parties to an insurance contract.  Each party must disclose in good faith “all facts within his knowledge which are or which he believes to be material to the contract . . . and which the other has not the means of ascertaining.” (§ 332.)  Concealment, “whether intentional or unintentional,” entitles the injured party to rescind. (§§ 330, 331.)  Materiality is judged “solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due.” (§ 334.)

    Passport’s principal argument, which the trial court accepted, was the source of funds could not be material because Starr never asked about it, did not list it in its underwriting manual, and took no steps to investigate.  The Court of Appeal rejected that contention.  Read together, sections 332, 334, and 336 make the applicant’s duty affirmative: the insurer has no duty to inquire unless a fact is “distinctly implied” by other disclosures or the insurer actually knows the application is untrue.  The question, therefore, “is not whether Starr asked about the source of Passport’s funds,” but whether its underwriting decision would have been different had the truth been disclosed.

    On that issue, the court held the answer was clear as a matter of law.  Although the trial court was free to discount the testimony of Starr’s underwriters, it erred in concluding the embezzlement was immaterial.  Because the use of embezzled funds “vastly increases the risk of a government seizure,” any rational insurer would decline the risk, exclude seizure coverage, or charge a higher premium.  In a footnote, the court was careful to add that Starr had no reason to suspect the truth: there were no “red flags,” and it took federal and state authorities years to uncover Avenatti’s crimes.

    Imputing the Manager’s Knowledge to the LLC

    The concealment theory required one more step.  Section 332 reaches only facts “within [the applicant’s] knowledge,” and Passport, as an entity, knows only what its agents know.  Under the general rule, an agent’s knowledge acquired within the scope of the agency is imputed to the principal.

    Passport 420 invoked the recognized exception for a “malevolent” or “rogue” agent, under which a principal is not charged with knowledge of an agent’s misdeeds when the agent acts adversely to it.  The court found the exception inapplicable for three reasons.  First, the embezzled funds allowed Passport 420 to complete the purchase.  Avenatti acted for the principal while harboring a personal adverse interest, a distinction California courts have long drawn.  Second, although Avenatti was not acting for Passport 420 when he stole the money, he “surely was acting as its agent” when he applied those funds to Passport 420’s purchase, and again when Passport 420 obtained the Starr policy.  Finally, the Restatement imputes notice even to an adversely acting agent’s principal “when necessary to protect the rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith.” (Rest.3d Agency, § 5.04.)  Nothing in the record suggested Starr was anything other than a good-faith counterparty.

    As a result, co-owner Parrish lost coverage for a $4 million asset because of a crime he did not know about.  The court did not avoid that consequence.  Instead, it emphasized that Passport, Parrish, and Starr were all victims of Avenatti, and it resolved the loss in favor of the party that dealt with the entity in good faith, based on its manager’s representations.

    Part Three: What If Parrish Had Been at the Controls?

    The court’s reasoning turns on a single fact: Avenatti was Passport’s manager, which allowed his knowledge to be imputed to Passport, and thereby triggered Passport’s duty to disclose to Starr all that Avenatti knew, including knowledge of his embezzlement.  Would the result have been any different if Parrish, rather than Avenatti, had been Passport’s manager during Passport’s dealings with Starr?

    An LLC has no mind of its own; it knows only what its agents know. (Civ. Code, § 2332.)  In a manager-managed California LLC, the manager is the company’s agent, but a member acting solely as a member is not.  On these facts, Passport’s knowledge would be Parrish’s knowledge, and Parrish knew nothing.

    Avenatti’s secret would then fall outside the company’s knowledge.  Funding a capital contribution is something a member does for itself, as an investor, not something it does for the company as its agent.  That distinction cuts directly against the court’s reasoning, which imputed Avenatti’s knowledge because he was “acting as [Passport’s] agent when he applied those funds to the aircraft purchase.”  Without that agency, the tainted source of Avenatti’s money is no more Passport’s knowledge than a seller’s undisclosed lien or a lender’s private financial trouble.  An insurer cannot rescind for concealment of a fact the applicant never knew.

    Starr would bear the burden of proving that Passport 420 knew the concealed fact.  In practice, however, Parrish would need to show that he could not have known that Avenatti had embezzled the funds he contributed to Passport 420, and that Passport 420 used to buy the jet, because that is where Starr would aim its fire.  To prevail, Parrish would need to establish three things.

    First, Parrish would need to show that he had no actual knowledge of the embezzlement.  The Court of Appeal made it clear that all the evidence suggested that Parrish had no such knowledge, thus it is likely that Parrish would have been able to meet this requirement.  Second, Parrish would need to show that nothing about Avenatti’s contribution should have prompted inquiry.  The court’s own footnote helps here: it found no “red flags” and noted that federal and state authorities took years to uncover Avenatti’s crimes.  That record forecloses any argument that Parrish turned a blind eye.  Finally, Parrish would need to show that Avenatti acted only as a member.  Avenatti, through his law firm, contributed his share, but he would need to have had no authority to negotiate the purchase, deal with the seller, or procure insurance on Passport’s behalf.

    The third element is where Parrish’s argument would be the most vulnerable.  On the actual facts, the purchase was Avenatti’s idea, he drafted the operating agreement, and his firm’s contribution was made at his direction.  If Avenatti did the same work without formally serving as Passport 420’s manager, Starr would likely argue he was Passport’s agent in fact, and his knowledge would be imputed regardless of who was named manager.  Agency follows authority, not titles.  If Parrish had managed Passport 420 from the start, and Avenatti’s role was limited to writing a check, the embezzlement likely would not have been within Passport’s knowledge, and Starr’s rescission defense would have failed.

    Timing matters.  On the real facts, Parrish took over as manager before signing the renewal under which the loss occurred, and the court still allowed rescission.  Taking control midflight is not enough—Parrish would have needed to do so before takeoff.  For co-owners, the lesson is simple: the manager’s identity may determine limits to coverage.

     

    Conclusion

    Passport 420 reinforces the affirmative duty on an insured to disclose material facts within its knowledge, regardless of whether the insurer specifically inquires.  The decision shows the consequences of imputing an agent’s knowledge to a business entity, even when the agent’s conduct is fraudulent and other members have no knowledge.  Although Parrish neither participated in nor knew of Avenatti’s embezzlement, Avenatti’s role as manager and his use of misappropriated funds for Passport 420’s benefit was enough to impute his knowledge to the company and allowed Starr to rescind the policy.

    The decision does not establish that an entity is charged with knowledge of every wrongful act by its members.  Instead, the analysis depends on the existence and scope of the agency relationship at the time of the conduct.  Had Parrish been manager from the start, and Avenatti acted only as a member contributing capital, the basis for imputing Avenatti’s knowledge to Passport 420 would have been much weaker.

    Accordingly, Passport 420 highlights the importance of identifying not only who holds managerial authority in a business entity but also who acts on its behalf in procuring insurance and conducting transactions.  Ultimately, the extent of managerial relationships may determine whether an innocent co-owner retains coverage or faces the consequences of another member’s undisclosed misconduct.

     

    For more information contact:

    Ben Patrick 

    310-552-3400

    bpatrick@gibbsgiden.com

    Ben Patrick represents companies in the construction industry, including general contractors, engineers, architects, and sureties. He has represented companies varying in size from small contractors and design firms to ENR Top 50 Firms in mediations, litigations and arbitrations with claims ranging from under $100,000 to over $300,000,000.

    Ben has represented clients on projects in every sector of the construction industry, including heavy civil (interstate highways, local highways and streets), industrial (manufacturing facilities, wastewater treatment plants, and pump stations), power and energy (ethanol refineries and combined-cycle power plants), commercial (mixed-use developments, mid-rise office towers, and retail developments), health care (hospitals and elder care facilities), education (universities, colleges, and primary schools), and residential (condominium construction and conversion, planned communities, and single-family homes).

    Or

    Micah Rabin

    424-402-5127

    mrabin@gibbsgiden.com

    Ms. Rabin represents clients in the areas of business, commercial, and construction litigation in addition to business and commercial transactions. Ms. Rabin has worked on complex construction litigation for private and public works projects, and contract drafting and analysis. She actively participates in litigation matters from inception through resolution, including drafting and responding to written discovery, researching and analyzing complex legal issues, and preparing for and participating in mediation and arbitration.

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